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Abstract
We initiate the study of multi-layered cake cutting
with the goal of fairly allocating multiple divisible
resources (layers of a cake) among a set of agents.
The key requirement is that each agent can only uti-
lize a single resource at each time interval. Sev-
eral real-life applications exhibit such restrictions
on overlapping pieces; for example, assigning time
intervals overmultiple facilities and resources or as-
signing shifts to medical professionals. We inves-
tigate the existence and computation of envy-free
and proportional allocations. We show that envy-
free allocations that are both feasible and contigu-
ous are guaranteed to exist for up to three agents
with two types of preferences, when the number of
layers is two. We also show that envy-free feasi-
ble allocations where each agent receives a polyno-
mially bounded number of intervals exist for any
number of agents and layers under mild conditions
on agents’ preferences. We further devise an al-
gorithm for computing proportional allocations for
any number of agents and layers.
1 Introduction
Consider a group of students who wish to use multiple col-
lege facilities such as a conference room and an exercise room
over different periods of time. Each student has a preference
over what facility to use at different time of the day: Alice
prefers to set her meetings in the morning and exercise in the
afternoon, whereas Bob prefers to start the day with exercis-
ing for a couple of hours and meet with his teammates in the
conference room for the rest of the day.
The fair division literature has extensively studied the prob-
lem of dividing a heterogeneous divisible resource (aka a
cake) among several agents who may have different prefer-
ence over the various pieces of the cake (Steinhaus, 1948;
Robertson and Webb, 1998; Brams et al., 2006). These stud-
ies have resulted in a plethora of axiomatic and existence
results (Barbanel, 2005; Moulin, 2004) as well as com-
putational solutions (Procaccia, 2013; Aziz and Mackenzie,
2016b) under a variety of assumptions, and were successfully
implemented in practice (see (Procaccia and Moulin, 2016;
Brams and Taylor, 1996) for an overview). In the case of Al-
ice and Bob, each facility represents a layer of the cake in a
multi-layered cake cutting problem, and the question is how
to allocate the time intervals (usage right) of the facilities ac-
cording to their preferences in a fair manner.
One naive approach is to treat each cake independently and
solve the problem through well-established cake-cutting tech-
niques by performing a fair division on each layer separately.
However, this approach has major drawbacks: First, the final
outcome, although fair on each layer, may not necessarily be
fair overall. Second, the allocation may not be feasible, i.e., it
may assign two overlapping pieces (time intervals) to a single
agent. In our example, Alice cannot simultaneously utilize
the exercise room and the conference room at the same time if
she receives overlapping intervals. Several other application
domains exhibit similar structures over resources: assigning
nurses to various wards and shifts, doctors to operation rooms,
and research equipment to groups, to name a few.
In multi-layared cake cutting, each layer represents a divis-
ible resource. Each agent has additive preferences over every
disjoint (non-overlapping) intervals. A division of a multi-
layered cake is feasible if no agent’s share contains overlap-
ping intervals, and is contiguous if each allocated piece of
a layer is contiguous. There has been some recent work on
dividing multiple cakes among agents (Cloutier et al., 2010;
Lebert et al., 2013). Yet, none of the previous work consid-
ered the division of multiple resources under feasibility and
contiguity constraints. In this paper, we thus ask the follow-
ing question:
What fairness guarantees can be achieved under
feasibility and contiguity constraints for various
number of agents and layers?
1.1 Our Results
We initiate the study of the multi-layered cake cutting prob-
lem for allocating divisible resources, under contiguity and
feasibility requirements. Our focus is on two fairness no-
tions, envy-freeness and proportionality. Envy-freeness (EF)
requires that each agent believes no other agent’s share is bet-
ter than its share of the cake. Proportionality (Prop) among n
agents requires that each agent receives a share that is valued
at least 1
n
of the value of the entire cake. For efficiency, we
consider complete divisions with no leftover pieces.
Agents (n) Layers (m) EF Prop
2 2 ✓(Thm. 1 ) ✓(Thm. 5)
3 2 ✓(Thm. 3♦†) ✓(Thm. 5)
any n ≥ m 2a, a ∈ Z+ ✓(Thm. 3
♦†) ✓(Thm. 5)
any n ≥ m any m ✓(Thm. 3♦†) ✓(Thm. 7♦)
Table 1: The overview of our results. † assumes continuity of value
density functions. ♦ indicates that existence holds without contigu-
ity requirement. Note that when m > n, no complete and feasible
(non-overlapping) solution exists.
Focusing on envy-free divisions, we show the existence of
envy-free and complete allocations that are both feasible and
contiguous for two-layered cakes and up to three agents with
at most two types of preferences. These cases are particularly
appealing since many applications often deal with dividing a
small number of resources among few agents (e.g. assigning
meeting rooms). Turning our attention to the case when the
contiguity requirement is dropped, we then show that envy-
free feasible allocations exist for any number n of agents and
any numberm of layers with m ≤ n, under mild conditions
on agents’ preferences. We further show that proportional
complete allocations that are both feasible and contiguous ex-
ist when the number of layers isa power of two. Subsequently,
we show that although this result cannot be immediately ex-
tended to any number of agents and layers, a proportional
complete allocation that is feasible exists when the number of
layers is at most the number of agents, and can be computed
efficiently.
1.2 Related Work
In recent years, cake cutting has received significant atten-
tion in artificial intelligence and economics as a metaphor
for algorithmic approaches in achieving fairness in alloca-
tion of resources (Procaccia, 2013; Braˆnzei and Nisan, 2019;
Kurokawa et al., 2013; Aziz and Mackenzie, 2016a). Re-
cent studies have focused on the fair division of resources
when agents have requirements over multiple resources that
must be simultaneously allocated in order to carry out
certain tasks (e.g. CPU and RAM) (Ghodsi et al., 2011;
Gutman and Nisan, 2012; Parkes et al., 2015). The most rele-
vant work to ours is the envy-free multi-cake fair division that
considers dividing multiple cakes among agents with linked
preferences over the cakes. Here, agents can simultaneously
benefit from all allocated pieces with no constraints. They
show that envy-free divisions with only few cuts exist for
two agents and many cakes, as well as three agents and two
cakes (Cloutier et al., 2010; Lebert et al., 2013; Nyman et al.,
2020). In contrast, a multi-layered cake cutting requires non-
overlapping pieces. Thus, Cloutier et al. (2010)’s generalized
envy-freeness notion on multiple cakes does not immediately
imply envy-freeness in our setting and no longer induces a
feasible division.
2 Our Model
Our setting includes a set of agents denoted by N = [n], a
set of layers denoted by L = [m], where for a natural number
s ∈ N, [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. Given two real numbers x, y ∈ R,
we write [x, y] = { z ∈ R | x ≤ z ≤ y } to denote an interval.
We denote by R+ (respectively Z+) the set of non-negative
reals (respectively, integers) including 0. A piece of cake is
a finite set of disjoint subintervals of [0, 1]. We say that a
subinterval of [0, 1] is a contiguous piece of cake. An m-
layered cake is denoted by C = (Cj)j∈L where Cj ⊆ [0, 1] is
a contiguous piece for j ∈ L. We refer to each j ∈ L as j-th
layer and Cj as j-th layered cake.
Each agent i is endowed with a non-negative integrable
density function vij : Cj → R+. For a given piece of cake
X of j-th layer, Vij(X) denotes the value assigned to it by
agent i, i.e., Vij(X) =
∑
I∈X
∫
x∈I
vij(x)dx. These func-
tions are assumed to be normalized over layers: for each
i ∈ N ,
∑
j∈L Vij(Cj) = 1. A layered piece is a sequence
X = (Xj)j∈L of pieces of each layer j ∈ L; a layered piece
is said to be contiguous if each Xj is a contiguous piece of
each layer. We assume valuation functions are additive on
layers and write Vi(X ) =
∑
j∈L Vij(Xj).
A layered contiguous piece is said to be non-overlapping
if no two pieces from different layers overlap, i.e, for any pair
of distinct layers j, j′ ∈ L and for any I ∈ Xj and I ′ ∈ Xj′ ,
I ∩ I ′ = ∅. For two layered pieces X and X ′, we say that
agent i weakly prefers X to X ′ if Vi(X ) ≥ Vi(X ′).
A multi-allocationA = (A1,A2, . . . ,An) is a partition of
them-layered cake C where eachAi = (Aij)j∈L is a layered
piece of the cake allocated to agent i; we refer to each Ai as
a bundle of i. For a multi-allocation A and i ∈ N , we write
Vi(Ai) =
∑
j∈L Vij(Aij) to denote the value of agent i for
Ai. A multi-allocationA is said to be
• contiguous if each Ai for i ∈ N is contiguous;
• feasible if eachAi for i ∈ N is non-overlapping.
We focus on complete multi-allocations where the entire
cake must be allocated. Notice that some layers may be dis-
joint (see Figure 1), and the number of agents must exceed the
number of layers, i.e. n ≥ m; otherwise the multi-allocation
will contain overlapping pieces. We illustrate our model in
the following example.
Example 1 (Resource sharing). Suppose that there are three
meeting rooms r1, r2, and r3 with different capacities, and
three researchers Alice, Bob, and Charlie. The first room is
available all day, the second and the third rooms are only
available in the morning and late afternoon, respectively (see
Fig. 1). Each researcher has a preference over the access
time to the shared rooms. For example, Alice wants to have
a group meeting in the larger room in the morning and then
have an individual meeting in the smaller one in the after-
noon.
Fairness. A multi-allocation is said to be envy-free if no
agent envies the others, i.e., Vi(Ai) ≥ Vi(Ai′ ) for any pair
of agents i, i′ ∈ N . A multi-allocation is said to be pro-
portional if each agent gets his proportional fair share, i.e.,
Vi(Ai) ≥
1
n
for any i ∈ N . The following implication, which
is well-known for the standard setting, holds in our setting as
well.
Lemma 1. An envy-free complete multi-allocation satisfies
proportionality.
r1
r2
r3
time
Figure 1: Example of a multi-layered cake. There are three meeting
rooms r1, r2, and r3 with different capacities, shared among several
research groups.
Proof. Consider an envy-free complete multi-allocation
Ai = (Aij)j∈L and an agent i ∈ N . By envy-freeness, we
have that Vi(Ai) ≥ Vi(Aj) for any j ∈ N . Summing over
j ∈ N , we get Vi(Ai) ≥
1
n
∑
j∈N Vi(Aj) =
1
n
by additiv-
ity.
Them-layered cuts. In order to cut the layered cake while
satisfying the non-overlapping constraint, we define a partic-
ular approach for partitioning the entire cake into diagonal
pieces. Consider the m-layered cake C where m is an even
number. For each point x of the interval [0, 1], we define
• LR(x, C) = (
⋃m
2
j=1 Cj ∩ [0, x])∪ (
⋃m
j=m
2
+1 Cj ∩ [x, 1]);
• RL(x, C) = (
⋃m
2
j=1 Cj ∩ [x, 1])∪ (
⋃m
j=m
2
+1 Cj ∩ [0, x]).
LR(x, C) consists of the top-half subintervals of points left
of x and the lower-half subintervals of points right of x; simi-
larly, RL(x, C) consists of the top-half subintervals of points
right of x and the lower-half subintervals of points left of x
(Fig. 2). We abuse the notation and write LR(x) = LR(x, C)
and RL(x) = RL(x, C) if C is clear from the context.
x = 0
LR(x)
RL(x)
j = 1
j = 2
j = 3
j = 4
x = 2
5
LR(x)
LR(x)
RL(x)
RL(x)
j = 1
j = 2
j = 3
j = 4
Figure 2: Examples of the partitions induced by x = 0 and x = 2
5
for a four-layered cake.
Computational model. Following the standard Robertson-
Webb Model (Robertson and Webb, 1998), we introduce two
types of queries: those for a cake on each layer (called a short
knife) and those for the entire cake (called a long knife).
Short knife. Short eval query: given an interval [x, y] of the
j-th layered cake Cj , evalj(i, x, y) asks agent i for its value
[x, y], i.e., Vij([x, y]). Short cut query: given a point x and
r ∈ [0, 1], cutj(i, x, r) asks agent i for the minimum point y
such that Vij([x, y]) = r.
Long knife. Long eval query: given a point x, eval(i, x)
asks agent i for its value LR(x), i.e., Vi(LR(x)). Long cut
query: given r ∈ [0, 1], cut(i, r) asks agent i for the mini-
mum point x such that Vi(LR(x)) = r if such point x exists.
3 Existence of a switching point
We start by showing the existence of a point x that equally
divides the entire cake into two pairs of diagonal pieces, both
for the individuals and for the majority; these will serve as
a fundamental property in our problem. We say that x ∈
[0, 1] is a switching point for agent i over a layered cake C if
Vi(LR(x)) = Vi(RL(x)).
Lemma 2. Suppose that the numberm of layers is even. Take
any i ∈ N . Let r ∈ R be such that (i) Vi(LR(0)) ≥ r and
Vi(RL(0)) ≤ r, or (ii) Vi(LR(0)) ≤ r and Vi(RL(0)) ≥ r.
Then, there exists a point x ∈ [0, 1] such that i values LR(x)
exactly at r, i.e. Vi(LR(x)) = r. In particular, a switching
point for i always exists.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that Vi(LR(0)) ≥
r and Vi(RL(0)) ≤ r. Consider the function f(x) =
Vi(LR(x)) for x ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that f(x) is a contin-
uous function written as the sum of continuous functions:
f(x) =
∑m
2
j=1 Vij(Cj ∩ [0, x]) +
∑m
j=m
2
+1 Vij(Cj ∩ [x, 1]).
Since f(0) ≥ r and f(1) ≤ r, there is a point x ∈ [0, 1]
with f(x) = r by the intermediate value theorem, which
proves the claim. Further, by taking r = 12 , the point x where
Vi(LR(x)) =
1
2 is a switching point for agent i.
We will generalize the notion of a switching point from
the individual level to the majority. For layered contiguous
pieces I and I ′, we say that the majority weakly prefer I to
I ′ (denoted by I
m
I ′) if there exists S ⊆ N such that |S| ≥
⌈n2 ⌉ and each i ∈ S weakly prefers I to I
′. We say that x ∈
[0, 1] is a majority switching point over C if LR(x)
m
RL(x)
and RL(x)
m
LR(x). The following lemma guarantees the
existence of a majority switching point, for any even number
of layers and any number of agents.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the number of layers, m, is even.
Then, there exists a majority switching point for any number
n ≥ m of agents.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that the majority
of agents weakly prefer LR(0) to RL(0). Since LR(0) =
RL(1) and RL(0) = LR(1), this means that by the time
when the long knife reaches the right-most point, i.e., x = 1,
the majority preference switches.
Formally, consider the following set of points x ∈ [0, 1]
where the majority weakly prefer LR(x) to RL(x):
M := { x ∈ [0, 1] | LR(x)
m
RL(x) }.
We will first show that M is a compact set. Clearly, M is
bounded. To show that M is closed, consider an infinite se-
quence as follows X = {xk}k=1,2,... ⊆ M that converges
to x∗. For each k = 1, 2, . . ., we denote by Sk the set
of agents who weakly prefer LR(xk) to RL(xk); by defini-
tion, |Sk| ≥ ⌈
n
2 ⌉. Since there are finitely many subsets of
agents, there is one subset Sk j N that appears infinitely
often; let S∗ be such subset and {x∗k}k=1,2,... be an infinite
sub-sequence of X such that for each k, each agent in S∗
weakly prefers LR(x∗k) to RL(x
∗
k). Since the valuations
Vi for i ∈ S∗ are continuous, each agent i ∈ S∗ weakly
prefers LR(x∗) to RL(x∗) at the limit x∗, which implies that
x∗ ∈ M and hence M is closed. Now since M is a com-
pact set, the supremum t∗ = supM belongs to M . By the
maximality of t∗, at least ⌈n2 ⌉ agents weakly prefer RL(t
∗)
to LR(t∗). Since t∗ ∈ M , at least ⌈n2 ⌉ agents weakly prefer
LR(t∗) toRL(t∗) as well. Thus, t∗ corresponds to a majority
switching point.
4 Envy-free multi-layered cake cutting
First, we will look into the problem of obtaining complete
envy-free multi-allocations, while satisfying non-overlapping
constraints. When there is only one layer, it is known that
an envy-free contiguous allocation exists for any number
of agents under mild assumptions on agents’ preferences
(Stromquist, 1980; Su, 1999). Given the contiguity and feasi-
bility constraints, the question is whether it is possible to guar-
antee an envy-free division in the multi-layered cake-cutting
model.
4.1 Two agents and two layers
We answer the above question positively for a simple, yet
important, case of two agents and two layers. The standard
protocol that achieves envy-freeness for two agents is known
as the cut-and-choose protocol: Alice divides the entire cake
into two pieces of equal value. Bob selects his preferred piece
over the two pieces, leaving the remainder for Alice.
We extend this protocol to the multi-layered cake cutting
using the notion of a switching point. Alice first divides the
layered cake into two diagonal pieces: one that includes the
top left and lower right parts and another that includes the
top right and lower left parts of the cake. Our version of the
cut-and-choose protocol is specified as follows:
Cut-and-choose protocol for n = 2 agents over a two-
layered cake C:
Step 1. Alice selects her switching point x over C.
Step 2. Bob chooses a weakly preferred layered contiguous
piece among LR(x) and RL(x).
Step 3. Alice receives the remaining piece.
x
LR(x)
LR(x)RL(x)
RL(x)
Figure 3: Cut-and-Choose for two-layered cake
Theorem 1. The cut-and-choose protocol yields a complete
envy-free multi-allocation that is feasible and contiguous for
two agents and a two-layered cake usingO(1) number of long
eval and cut queries.
Proof. It is immediate to see that the protocol returns a com-
plete multi-allocation where each agent is assigned to a non-
overlapping layered contiguous piece. The resulting alloca-
tion satisfies envy-freeness: Bob does not envy Alice since
he chooses a preferred piece amongLR(x) andRL(x). Alice
does not envy Bob by the definition of a switching point.
As we noted in Section 2, the existence result for two
agents does not extend beyond two layers: if there are at least
three layers, there is no feasible multi-allocation that com-
pletely allocates the cake to two agents.
4.2 Three agents and two layers
We move on to the case of three agents and two layers. We
will design a variant of Stromquist’s protocol that achieves
envy-freeness for one-layered cake (Stromquist, 1980): The
referee moves two knives: a short knife and a long knife. The
short knife points to the point y and moves from left to right
over the top layer, gradually increasing the left-most top piece
(denoted by Y ). The long knife keeps pointing to the point
x, which can partition the remaining cake, denoted by C−y ,
into two diagonal pieces LR(x) and RL(x) in an envy-free
manner. Each agent shouts when the left-most top piece Y be-
comes at least as highly valuable as the preferred piece among
LR(x) and RL(x). Some agent, say s, shouts eventually (be-
fore the left-most top piece becomes the top layer), assuming
that there is at least one agent who weakly prefers the top
layer to the bottom layer. We note that x may be positioned
left to y; see Figure 4 for some possibilities of the long knife’s
locations.
We will show that the above protocol works, for a special
case when there are at most two types of preferences: In such
cases, the majority switching points coincide with the switch-
ing points of an agent with the majority preference.
Lemma 4. Suppose that m = 2, n = 3, and there are two
different agents i, j ∈ N with the same valuation V . Then,
x is a majority switching point over C if and only if x is a
switching point for i.
Proof. Suppose that agents i, j ∈ N have the same valuation
V . Suppose that x is a majority switching point over C. Then,
at least two agents weakly prefer LR(x) to RL(x), mean-
ing that at least one of the two agents i and j weakly prefers
LR(x) to RL(x), which means that both agents weakly
prefers LR(x) to RL(x) since i and j’s valuations are iden-
tical. Similarly, both i and j weakly prefer RL(x) to LR(x).
Thus, x is a switching point for i. The converse direction is
immediate.
An implication of the above lemma is that when perform-
ing Stromquist’s protocol, one can point out to a switching
point of an individual, instead of a majority one. This allows
the value of each piece to change continuously. For a given
two-layered cake C, we write C−y = (C−y1 , C2) as a two-
layered cake obtained from C where the first segment [0, y] of
the top layer is removed, i.e., C
−y
1 = C1 \ [0, y]. For each
majority switching point x over C−y , we select three different
agents ℓ(x),m(x), and r(x) as follows:
• ℓ(x) is an agent who weakly prefers LR(x, C−y) to
RL(x, C−y);
• m(x) is an agent who is indifferent betweenLR(x, C−y)
and RL(x, C−y); and
YRL(x)
RL(x)
LR(x)
x y
Y
xy
RL(x)
RL(x)LR(x)
LR(x)
Figure 4: Moving knife protocol for three agents over a two-layered
cake. Note that the position of x may appear before y.
• r(x) and agent who weakly prefers RL(x, C−y) to
LR(x, C−y).
Theorem 2. Suppose thatm = 2 and n = 3. If there are two
different agents with the same valuation, an envy-free com-
plete multi-allocation that is feasible and contiguous exists.
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that at least one agent prefers the
top layer over the bottom layer. This means that such agent
weakly prefers the top layer to any of the pieces LR(z, C−y)
and RL(z, C−y) when y = 1. Suppose that i ∈ N is one of
the two different agents with the same valuations. We design
the following protocol for three agents over a two-layered
cake:
Moving-knife protocol for n = 3 agents over a two-layered
cake C: w.l.o.g. assume that at least one agent weakly prefers
the top layer (j = 1) over the bottom layer (j = 2)
Step 1. The referee continuously moves a short knife from
the left-most point (y = 0) to the right-most point (y = 1)
over the top layer, while continuously moving a long knife
pointing to a switching point over C−y for i. Let y be the
position of the short knife and Y be the top layer piece to its
left. Let x be the position of the long knife.
Step 2. The referee stops moving the short knife when some
agent s shouts, i.e., Y becomes at least as highly valuable as
the preferred piece among LR(x, C−y) and RL(x, C−y).
Step 3. We allocate the shouter s to the left-most top piece
Y and partitions the rest into LR(x, C−y) and RL(x, C−y).
• If s = ℓ(x), then we allocate LR(x, C−y) tom(x) and
RL(x, C−y) to r(x).
• If s = m(x), then we allocate LR(x, C−y) to ℓ(x) and
RL(x, C−y) to r(x).
• If s = r(x), then we allocate LR(x, C−y) to ℓ(x) and
RL(x, C−y) tom(x).
By our assumption, some agent eventually shouts and thus
the protocol returns an allocation A. Clearly, A is feasible,
contiguous, and complete. Also, it is easy to see that the
shouter s who receives a bundle Y does not envy the other
two agents. The agents i 6= s do not envy s because the
referee continuously moves both a short and a long knife. Fi-
nally, the agents i 6= s do not envy each other by the definition
of a majority switching point and by Lemma 4.
In the general case, the existence question of contiguous
and feasible envy-freemulti-allocations deems to be challeng-
ing due to the non-monotonicity of valuations over diagonal
pieces.1 In the next subsection, we thus turn our attention to
the case when the contiguity requirement is relaxed.
4.3 Non-connected pieces
Having seen that an envy-free multi-allocation that is both
feasible and contiguous exists for a special case, we will con-
sider the case when the contiguity requirement is dropped,
namely, agents may receive a collection of sub-intervals of
each layer. We will show the existence of an envy-free multi-
allocation that is feasible and uses at most poly(n) number
of cuts within each layer, assuming that each density function
vij is continuous. In what follows, we will reduce the prob-
lem to finding a ‘perfect’ allocation of a one-layered cake.
An allocation of a single-layered cake is called perfect if each
agent values every allocated piece exactly at his proportional
fair share 1
n
. It is known that such allocation consisting of at
most poly(n) number of contiguous pieces exists whenever
agents’ value density functions are continuous (Alon, 1987).
It is not surprising that the existence of a perfect allocation
implies the existence of an envy-free allocation over a single-
layered cake. We show that this result also implies the exis-
tence of envy-free allocations over a multi-layered cake.
Theorem 3. Suppose that m ≤ n and each vi,j for i ∈ N
and j ∈ L is continuous. Then, an envy-free complete fea-
sible multi-allocation A = (Ai)i∈N where each piece Aij
for agent i ∈ N and layer j ∈ L contains at most poly(n)
number of contiguous pieces exists.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that each layer
Cj is the whole interval [0, 1] by just putting zero valuations
on the part outside Cj . Now, we construct an instance of
a single-layered cake I = [0, 1] as follows. First, create a
dummy agent ij for each agent i ∈ N and each layer j ∈
L. Each dummy agent ij has a valuation v
′
ij
determined by
agent i’s valuation for the j-th layered cake, i.e., for each sub-
interval X ⊆ I , v′ij (X) = vi,j(X). We will show that a
perfect allocation of the artificial cake among themn dummy
agents induces an envy-free multi-allocation of the original
layered cake.
Specifically, take a perfect allocation (X1, X2, . . . , Xmn)
of this instance where each Xt for t ∈ [mn] contains at most
poly(n) number of contiguous pieces, which is guaranteed
to exist (Alon, 1987). We then group each consecutivem se-
quence of pieces together: namely, let Yh =
⋃im
t=(i−1)m+1Xt
for each h ∈ [n]. By the definition of a perfect allocation, we
have
vij(Yh) =
vij(Cj)
n
, (1)
for any h ∈ [n]. Now, we partition each layer into n pieces
using the partition (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) of the artificial cake and
allocate to the agents so that each agent receives exactly one
piece Yh for each layer. Formally, consider a permutation
σj : [n]→ [n] where
σj(i) = i + j − 1 (mod m).
1See Section 6 for an extensive discussion.
Construct an multi-allocation A = (Ai)i∈N where each
agent i ∈ N is assigned to Aij = Yσj(i) for each layer j ∈ L.
By our construction, each Aij contains at most poly(n) num-
ber of contiguous pieces. Also, each layered piece Ai is non-
overlapping as (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) is a partition of the interval
[0, 1]. By (1), it is immediate to see that A is envy-free.
5 Proportional multi-layered cake cutting
Focusing on a less demanding fairness notion, it turns out
that a complete proportional multi-allocation that is both fea-
sible and contiguous exists, for a wider class of instances, i.e.,
when the numberm of layers is some power of two, and the
number n of agents is at least m. Notably, we show that
the problem can be decomposed into smaller instances when
the number of agents is at least the number of layers and the
number of layers is a power of two. Building up on the base
case of two layers, our algorithm recursively calls the same
algorithm to decide on how to allocate the cake of the sub-
problems. We further show that if we relax the contiguity
requirement, a proportional feasible multi-allocation can be
computed efficiently wheneverm ≤ n.
5.1 Connected pieces
In this subsection, we will show that a proportional complete
multi-allocation exists for any n ≥ m whenm is some power
of 2. We start by presenting two auxiliary lemmata. We define
a merge of two disjoint contiguous pieces Ij and Ij′ of layers
j and j′ as replacing the j-th layered cake with the union
Ij∪Ij′ and removing j′-th layered cake. Themerge of a finite
sequence of mutually disjoint contiguous pieces (I1, . . . , Ik)
can be defined inductively: merge (I1, . . . , Ik−1) and then
apply the merge operation to the resulting outcome and Ik .
Now we observe that if there are two disjoint layers, one can
safely merge these layers and reduce the problem size.
Lemma 5. Suppose that Cj and Cj′ are two disjoint layers
of a layered cake C, and C′ is obtained from C by merging
Cj and Cj′ . Then, each non-overlapping contiguous layered
piece of C′ is a non-overlapping contiguous layered piece of
the original cake C.
Proof. Suppose that Cj and Cj′ are two disjoint layers of
a layered cake C = (Ct)t∈L, and the layered cake C′ =
(C′t)t∈L\{j′} is obtained from C by merging Cj and Cj′ . Let
X ′ = (X ′t)t∈L\{j′} be a non-overlapping contiguous piece of
C′. Consider the corresponding layered piece X = (Xt)t∈L
of the original cake C whereXt = X ′t for t ∈ L \ {j, j
′} and
Xt = X
′
t ∩ Ct for t ∈ {j, j
′}. It is immediate to see that
X ′ is non-overlapping and contiguous, since Cj and Cj′ are
disjoint.
The above lemma can be generalized further: Let C be
a 2m-layered cake and x ∈ [0, 1]. We define a merge of
LR(x) = (Sj)j∈L by merging the pair (Sj , Sj+m) for each
j ∈ [m]. Amerge ofRL(x) can be defined analogously. Such
operation still preserves both feasibility and contiguity.
Corollary 1. Let C be a 2m-layered cake and x ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose that C′ is a m-layered cake obtained by merging
LR(x, C) or RL(x, C). Then, each non-overlapping contigu-
ous layered piece of C′ is a non-overlapping contiguous lay-
ered piece of the original cake C.
Proof. Suppose that C′ is am-layered cake obtained by merg-
ing LR(x, C) = (Sj)j∈L of a 2m-layered cake C. By Lemma
5, a non-overlapping contiguous layered piece of the cake ob-
tained from each merge of the pair (Sj , Sj+m) for j ∈ [m]
still corresponds to a non-overlapping and contiguous piece
of the original cake. Thus, the claim holds. An analogous
argument applies to the case when we merge RL(x, C).
We are now ready to prove that a proportional complete
multi-allocation exists for any n = m whenm is some power
of 2. In essence, the existence of a majority switching point,
as proved in Lemma 3, allows us to divide the problem into
two instances. We will repeat this procedure until the number
of layers of the subproblem becomes 2, for which we know
the existence of a proportional, feasible, contiguous multi-
allocation by Theorem 1.
Theorem 4. A proportional complete multi-allocation that is
feasible and contiguous exists, for any number m of layers
and any number n = m of agents where m = 2a for some
a ∈ Z+.
Proof. We design the following recursive algorithm D that
takes a subset N ′ of agents with |N ′| ≥ 2, a |L′|-layered
cake C′, and a valuation profile (Vi)i∈N ′ , and returns a pro-
portional complete multi-allocation of the cake to the agents
which is feasible. Suppose that m = n. If m = n = 1, then
we allocate the entire cake to the single agent. Ifm = n = 2,
we run the cut-and-choose algorithm as described in the proof
of Theorem 1. Now consider the case when m = n = 2a
for some integers a ≥ 1. Then the algorithm finds a ma-
jority switching point x over C′. We let I1 = LR(x) and
I2 = RL(x). By definition of a majority switching point and
the fact that n is even, we can partition the set of agents N ′
into N1 and N2 where N1 is the set of agents who weakly
prefer I1 to I2, N2 be the set of agents who weakly prefer
I2 to I1, and |Nk| =
|N ′|
2 for each k = 1, 2. We apply D
to the merge of Ik with the agent set Nk for each k = 1, 2,
respectively.
We will show that by induction on the exponential a, that
the complete multi-allocation A returned by D satisfies pro-
portionality as well as feasibility and contiguity. This is
clearly true when m = n = 2 due to Lemma 1 and The-
orem 1. Suppose that the claim holds for m = n = 2a
with 1 ≤ a ≤ k − 1; we will prove it for a = k. Sup-
pose that the algorithm divides the input cake C′ via a ma-
jority switching point x into I1 = LR(x) and I2 = RL(x).
Suppose that (N1, N2) is a partition of the agents where N1
is the set of agents who weakly prefer I1 to I2, N2 is the
set of agents who weakly prefer I2 to I1, and |Nk| =
|N ′|
2
for each k = 1, 2. Observe that each agent i ∈ N1 weakly
prefers I1 to I2 and thus Vi(I1) ≥
1
2Vi(C
′). Similarly,
Vi(I2) ≥
1
2Vi(C
′) for each i ∈ N2. Thus, by the induc-
tion hypothesis, each agent i has value at least 1|N ′|Vi(C
′)
for its allocated piece Ai. Further, by Corollary 1, each non-
overlapping contiguous layered piece of the merge of I1 (re-
spectively, I2) is a contiguous non-overlapping layered piece
of the original cake C. By the induction hypothesis, the al-
gorithm outputs a multi-allocation of each merge that is con-
tiguous. Thus, the algorithm returns a proportional complete
multi-allocation that is feasible and contiguous.
We will generalize the above theorems to the case when
the number of agents is strictly greater than the number of
layers. Intuitively, when n > m, then there is at least one
layer whose sub-piece can be ‘safely’ allocated to some agent
without violating the non-overlapping constraint.
Theorem 5. A proportional complete multi-allocation that is
feasible and contiguous exists, for any number m of layers
and any number n ≥ m of agents where m = 2a for some
a ∈ Z+.
Proof. We design the following recursive algorithm D that
takes a subset N ′ of agents with |N ′| ≥ 2, a |L′|-layered
cake C′, and a valuation profile (Vi)i∈N ′ , and returns a pro-
portional complete multi-allocation of the layered cake to the
agents which is feasible. For n = m, we apply the algorithm
described in the proof of Theorem 4. Suppose that n > m.
The algorithm first identifies a layer Cj whose entire valua-
tion is at least 1
n
for some agent; assume w.l.o.g. that j = 1.
We move a knife from left to right over the top cake C1 un-
til some agent i shouts, i.e., agent i finds the left contiguous
piece Y at least as highly valued as his proportional fair share
1
n
. The algorithm D then gives the piece to the shouter. To
decide on the allocation of the remaining items, we apply
D to the reduced instance (N ′ \ {i}, (C′j)j∈L, (Vi′)i′∈N ′\{i})
where C′j = Cj \ Y for j = 1 and C
′
j = Cj for j 6= 1.
We will prove by induction on |N ′| that the complete multi-
allocation A = (A1,A2, . . . ,An) returned by D satisfies
proportionality as well as feasibility and contiguity. This is
clearly true whenm = |N ′|, due to Theorem 4. Suppose that
the claim holds for |N ′| with m ≤ |N ′| ≤ k − 1; we will
prove it for |N ′| = k. Suppose agent i is the shouter who
gets the left contiguous piece Y . Clearly, agent i receives
her proportional share under A. Observe that all remaining
agents have the value at least
|N ′|−1
|N ′| Vi(C
′) for the remaining
cake. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, each agent i′ 6= i
has value at least 1|N ′|Vi(C
′) for its allocated piece Ai′ . The
feasibility and contiguity ofA are immediate by the induction
hypothesis. This completes the proof.
5.2 Non-connected pieces
Since envy-freeness implies proportionality, Theorem 3 in the
previous section implies the existence of a proportional feasi-
ble multi-allocation when agents’ value density functions are
continuous. We strengthen this result, by showing that such
desirable allocation exists for a more general case and by pro-
viding an efficient algorithm for finding one.
Theorem 6. A proportional complete multi-allocation that
is feasible exists when m = n and can be computed using
O(nm2) number of short eval queries andO(nm) number of
long eval and cut queries. Further, each bundle of the result-
ing multi-allocation includes at most two contiguous pieces
within each layer.
Below, we show that each agent can divide the entire cake
into n equally valued layered pieces. A multi-allocationA is
equitable if for each agent i ∈ N , Vi(Ai) =
1
n
. We design a
recursive algorithm that iteratively finds two layers for which
one has value at most 1
m
and at least 1
m
and removes a pair of
diagonal pieces of value exactly 1
m
from the two layers.
Lemma 6. For any number m of layers and any number
n = m of agents with the identical valuations, an equitable
complete multi-allocation that is feasible and contiguous ex-
ists and can be found using O(nm2) number of short eval
queries and O(nm) number of long cut queries.
Proof. We denote by V = Vi the valuation function for each
agent i ∈ N . Consider the following recursive algorithm
D that takes a subset N ′ of agents with |N ′| ≥ 1, a |L′|-
layered cake C′, and a valuation profile (Vi)i∈N ′ , and re-
turns an equitable complete multi-allocation of the layered
cake to the agents. When |L′| = |N ′| = 1, then the algo-
rithm allocates the entire cake to the single agent. Suppose
that |L′| = |N ′| ≥ 2. The algorithm first finds a layer j
whose entire value is at most 1
m
and another layer j′ whose
entire value is at least 1
m
. The algorithm D then finds a point
x ∈ [0, 1] where V (Sj ∪ Sj′) =
1
m
for Sj = Cj ∩ [0, x] and
Sj′ = Cj ∩ [x, 1]; such point exists due to Lemma 2. We allo-
cate Sj ∪ Sj′ to one agent and applyD to the remaining cake
C′′ with |N ′| − 1 agents where C′′ is obtained from merging
the remaining j-th layered cake Cj \ Sj and the j
′-th layered
cake Cj′ \Sj′ . The correctness of the algorithm as well as the
bound on the query complexity are immediate.
Equipped with Lemma 6, we will prove Theorem 6 by
recursively computing an envy-free matching between n
agents and n layered pieces where one agent has propor-
tional fair share for every piece. Specifically, given a bi-
partite graph G with one side being the set of agents and
the other side being the set of items, an envy-free match-
ing M of G is a matching where no unmatched agent en-
vies some matched agent, i.e., no unmatched agent is adja-
cent to any matched item in G. The problem of finding an
envy-freematching of maximum size can be solved in polyno-
mial time (Aignerl-Horev and Segal-Halevi, 2019; Gan et al.,
2019). Further, using Hall’s type condition, it can be easily
shown that if there is one agent who is adjacent to every item
and the number of agents is at most the number of items, then
there is a non-empty envy-free matching (Corollary 1.4 (c) of
Aignerl-Horev and Segal-Halevi (2019)).
Proof of Thm. 6. In order to obtain a proportional feasible
multi-allocation, we will recursively compute a non-empty
envy-free matching: For each iteration, let one agent parti-
tion n-equally valued layered pieces, find a maximum envy-
free matching between agents and pieces, and assign the
matched agents to the matched pieces. By Corollary 1.4
(c) of Aignerl-Horev and Segal-Halevi (2019), the envy-free
matching computed at each step is non-empty; thus, at least
one agent is matched and we will apply the same procedure
I11
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I22I32
I33
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I32 I33
Figure 5: Protocol for proportionality for three agents and three layers. Agent 1 divides the entire cake into three equally valued layered
pieces I1, I2, and I3 (the left-most picture). Here, Ii = (Iij)j=1,2,3 for each i = 1, 2, 3 where I23 = I31 = ∅. In the middle picture, agent
1 is adjacent to every piece, meaning that he has value at least proportional fair share for every piece; on the other hand, the other agents are
adjacent to the second piece only. The maximum envy-free matching is an edge between I1 and agent 1 (red edge), so the algorithm allocates
I1 to agent 1 and merges I2, and I3. Then it applies the cut-and-choose among the remaining agents (the right-most picture).
to the unmatched agents and pieces. The formal descrip-
tion is given as follows. See Figure 5 for an illustration for
m = n = 3.
A protocol for proportional feasible multi-allocations for
n = m agents over am-layered cake C:
Step 1. One agent partitions the cake into n non-overlapping
layered contiguous pieces I1, I2, . . . , In which she consid-
ers of equal value, using the algorithm in the proof of Lemma
6.
Step 2. Construct a bipartite graph G with the agents being
one side and the pieces being on the other side, where there
is an edge between agent i and Ih if agent i has value at least
his proportional far share for Ih.
Step 3. Compute a maximum-size envy-free matchingM of
G. Assign matched agent to the corresponding piece.
Step 4. For each unmatched piece Ih, merge all the disjoint
contiguous pieces in Ih, and create a m − ℓ-layered cake
C′ consisting of each merge of Ih where ℓ is the number of
matched pieces. Apply the same protocol to C′ among the
remaining unmatched agents.
We will show by the induction on the number of agents
n = m that the resulting multi-allocation A is proportional
and feasible. The claim clearly holds for n = m = 1. Sup-
pose that the claim holds for n withm = n ≤ k − 1; we will
prove it form = n = k. We will first show that the resulting
multi-allocation A is proportional. Clearly, the agents who
get matched has proportional fair share for his bundle. Fur-
ther, each i of the remaining unmatched n − ℓ agents have
value less than 1
n
for each matched piece and thus has at least
1 − ℓ
n
for the remaining unmatched pieces; thus, Vi(Ai) is
at least 1
n
. It can be easily verified that each bundle Ai is
non-overlapping. Each iteration requires O(m2) number of
short eval queries and O(m) number of long cut queries for
the cutter, and O(m2) number of short eval queries for each
agent. Further, the number of iterations is at most n, which
proves the bound on the query complexity. This completes
the proof.
Similarly to the proof for Theorem 5, we can generalize
the above theorem to the case when the number of agents is
strictly greater than the number of layers.
Theorem 7. A proportional complete multi-allocation that is
feasible exists and can be computed using O(nm2) number
of short eval queries and O(nm) number of long cut queries,
for any numberm of layers and any number n ≥ m of agents.
It remains open whether a proportional contiguous multi-
allocation exists when the number of layers is three. A part
of the reason is that our algorithm for finding an equitable
multi-allocation (Lemma 6) may not return a ‘balanced’ par-
tition: The number of pieces contained in each layered piece
may not be the same when the number of layers is odd. For
example, one layered piece may contain pieces from three
different layers while the other two parts may contain pieces
from two different layers, as depicted in Figure 5.
6 Discussion
We initiated the study of multi-layered cake cutting, demon-
strating the rich and intriguing mathematical feature of the
problem. There are several exciting questions left open for
future work. Below, we list some of them.
• Existence of fair allocations: We have seen that an
envy-free contiguous and feasible multi-allocation of a
two-layered cake exists for two or three agents with at
most two types of preferences. An interesting open prob-
lem is whether such allocation also exists for any number
of agents over a two-layered cake. Onemight expect that
the Simmon-Su’s technique (Su, 1999) using Sperner’s
Lemma can be adopted to our setting by considering
all possible diagonal pieces. However, this approach
may not work because multi-layered cake-cutting nec-
essarily exhibits non-monotonicity in that the value of
a pair of diagonal pieces may decrease when the knife
moves from left to right. For proportionality, one intrigu-
ing future direction is extending our existence result for
m = 2a to anym. This requires careful consideration of
contiguity and feasibility, which are often at odds with
completeness.
• Query complexity of fair allocations: The query com-
plexity of finding an envy-free feasible multi-allocation
is open in the multi-layered cake-cutting problem. In
particular, it would be challenging to extend the cel-
ebrated result of Aziz and Mackenzie (2016a) – who
showed the existence of a bounded protocol for com-
puting an envy-free allocation of a single-layered cake
with any number n of agents – to our setting. We ex-
pect that a direct translation may not work, due to the
intricate nature of the feasibility constraint. With re-
spect to proportionality, our existence proof implies that
if there is a way to compute a majority switching point
efficiently, one can compute a proportional contiguous
feasible multi-allocation for special cases when the num-
ber of layers is a power of two. It is open whether such
cutting point can be computed using a bounded number
of queries.
• Approximate fairness: In the presence of contiguity
requirement, it is known that no finite protocol com-
putes an envy-free allocation even for three agents and
a single-layered cake (Stromquist, 2008). However, sev-
eral positive results are known when the aim is to ap-
proximately bound the envy between agents (Deng et al.,
2012; Goldberg et al., 2020; Arunachaleswaran et al.,
2019). Pursuing a similar direction in the context of
multi-layered cake cutting would be an interesting re-
search topic.
• Efficiency requirement: Besides fairness criteria, an-
other basic desideratum is economic efficiency. In
the context of a single-layered cake cutting, sev-
eral works studied the relation between fairness
and efficiency (Cohler et al., 2011; Bei et al., 2012;
Aumann and Dombb, 2015; Aumann et al., 2013). The
question of what welfare guarantee can be achieved to-
gether with fairness is open in our model. In particular,
it would be interesting to investigate the compatibility of
the fairness notions with an efficiency requirement, un-
der feasibility constraints.
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